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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Chief Judge. 
 
The City of Vineland appeals from a preliminary 
injunction issued by the district court which (1) enjoined 
the City from enforcing a municipal ordinance that 
restricted the hours of operation of sexually oriented 
businesses and (2) enjoined the City from enforcing a 
municipal ordinance that prohibited live entertainment in 
private "conversation booths" in adult bookstores. The City 
argues that the ordinances were supported by sufficient 
evidence of secondary effects to satisfy the intermediate 
level of scrutiny applicable to regulations of sexually 
oriented businesses under City of Renton v. Playtime 
Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986). 
 
I. 
 
A. 
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
On April 26, 1995, appellee Ben Rich Trading, Inc. 
entered into a lease and purchase agreement for a two- 
story building with an adjacent 34-space parking lot with 
the intention of transforming it into an adult entertainment 
center. The premises front on a state highway and there are 
varied commercial businesses located in the area, including 
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a restaurant/bar next door and a WaWa 24-hour 
convenience store across the highway. 
 
The first floor of the building consisted of three large 
open areas and an office; the second floor was designed as 
a residential apartment with a separate outside entrance. 
Previously, the premises had been used as a "Teen 
Nightclub" and had been configured with a dancefloor, 
lounge area and a video arcade. According to Vineland's 
Zoning Ordinance, the premises are located in a "B-2, 
Highway Business Zone," which, at the time Ben Rich took 
possession, permitted uses such as adult book stores, 
indoor theaters, bars and taverns, amusement facilities 
including video arcades, steam baths, and drive-in theaters. 
 
On May 1, 1995, Ben Rich advised Robert Blough, 
Vineland's Zoning Officer, of its intention to use the 
premises to exhibit live and video entertainment, as well as 
for the sale of books, videos and novelties of "an adult 
nature." App. at 22. On May 3, 1995, Blough replied by 
letter that such an adult entertainment center constituted 
a permitted use under the City's zoning regulations but 
that Ben Rich would nevertheless have to acquire site plan 
approval because an adult entertainment center 
represented a "change in use." App. at 25. Thereafter, Ben 
Rich filed an application for site plan approval with the 
Planning Board of the City of Vineland. Upon review of this 
application, Blough reversed his earlier position and 
informed Ben Rich that the proposed live entertainment in 
a "conversation booth" setting, whereby a patron in a booth 
could observe a live performer through glass and could 
communicate with the dancer through a telephone hook- 
up, was not a permitted use. App. at 27. 
 
Blough also advised the City's Minor Site Plan and 
Subdivision Committee at the hearing on Ben Rich's 
application that live entertainment in conversation booths 
was not a permitted use and could not receive site plan 
approval. Ben Rich then withdrew its request for 
conversation booths in order to receive the Committee's 
approval for the site plan, which it secured, and on August 
15, 1995 it opened an adult book store with booths for the 
viewing of sexually explicit videos. Meanwhile, it appealed 
Blough's decision that the proposed conversation booths 
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were an impermissible use to the City's Zoning Board of 
Adjustment. Ben Rich requested that in the alternative it be 
granted a variance to allow its proposed live entertainment 
in conversation booths. 
 
The Zoning Board of Adjustment held a hearing on 
August 16, 1995, but then adjourned until September 20, 
1995 so that Board members could engage in additional 
investigation. On August 22, 1995, while the Zoning Board 
was adjourned, the Vineland City Council enacted the two 
ordinances at issue. Ordinance 95-55 limited the hours of 
operation for sexually oriented businesses, including adult 
bookstores, from 8:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m., Mondays through 
Saturdays. App. at 39. Ordinance 95-56 prohibited live 
entertainment in private booths within adult bookstores by 
amending the "conditional uses" section of the zoning 
ordinance to provide: 
 
         (1) Uses within the confines of the adult bookstore are 
         restricted to the sale or rental of books, videos and 
         novelties, and on-site rental for viewing of videos or 
         movies. 
 
         (2) Specifically prohibited within the confines of an 
         adult bookstore is live entertainment through the use 
         of individual or conversation booths which allow 
         privacy between patrons and live entertainers; private 
         use of booths, screens, enclosures or other devices 
         which facilitate sexual activity by patrons. 
 
App. at 44. 
 
On September 20, 1995, the Zoning Board denied Ben 
Rich's appeal of the restriction on conversation booths as 
well as its application for a variance, expressly basing its 
decision on the passage of Ordinance 95-56. App. at 225- 
26. 
 
B. 
 
DISTRICT COURT PROCEEDINGS 
 
On September 26, 1995, Ben Rich filed a complaint in 
the District Court of New Jersey pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 
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SS 1983 and 1988, alleging that Vineland Ordinances 95-55 
and 95-56 violated its First Amendment right to exhibit and 
distribute sexually explicit materials. The district court 
granted a temporary restraining order on the operation of 
the hours ordinance and scheduled a preliminary 
injunction hearing. 
 
At the October 10, 1995 hearing the district court 
acknowledged that under City of Renton v. Playtime 
Theatres, 475 U.S. 41 (1986), a municipality is entitled to 
regulate constitutionally protected but sexually explicit 
speech as long as the regulation is directed solely towards 
ameliorating the purported secondary effects of such 
speech and is not directed at its content. The district court 
also acknowledged that, under Renton, a municipality does 
not have to conduct studies of its own documenting the 
purported secondary effects that the city hopes to control, 
but it can rely on studies or evidence accumulated by other 
jurisdictions in order to demonstrate the content-neutrality 
of its regulatory approach. App. at 196. Nevertheless, the 
court concluded that the City of Vineland had failed to 
demonstrate how the hours ordinance would remedy any 
secondary effects from the adult theaters in the City itself. 
 
In colloquy at the hearing, the court stated: 
 
         [The cases] require that there be an identifiable 
         secondary effect that exists reasonably under the 
         circumstances of this case in Vineland and not 
         because maybe it exists someplace else. And again I, 
         please, want you to understand, I'm not suggesting 
         that you need a study under Renton, but I do think we 
         have to in keeping with the Mitchell case look to the 
         restriction and see if it's intended to reduce the 
         undesirable secondary effect. 
 
App. at 196. The district court's reference to "the Mitchell 
case" was to this court's decision in Mitchell v. Comm'n on 
Adult Entertainment Establishments, 10 F.3d 123 (3d Cir. 
1993), sustaining a Delaware statute that restricted the 
hours of operation of adult entertainment centers. 
 
At the same hearing, counsel for Vineland asked if the 
court also intended to address the legality of Ordinance 95- 
56 which prohibited live entertainment in conversation 
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booths. See App. at 201-02. The court chose not to address 
that issue at that hearing, but offered the parties five days 
to submit briefs on the constitutionality of Ordinance 95- 
56. However, the court made clear that it believed the 
essence of Ordinance 95-56 to be a complete prohibition on 
the exhibition of live entertainment in adult bookstores: 
 
         But the ordinance does appear to read a complete 
         prohibition, which seems to be inconsistent with 
         Renton from the Mitchell case [sic] that wanted to 
         narrowly tailor.... If I then have all the submissions, I'll 
         certainly try to compose a response to what we've 
         heard today. 
 
App. at 202. Neither party submitted any additional 
material. 
 
On October 31, 1995, the court entered an order 
enjoining the City from enforcing the Ordinances "to the 
extent that they prohibit plaintiffs from continuing the 
Monday through Saturday hours of operation of 9:30 A.M. 
to 1:30 A.M. consistent with [the] court's previous orders." 
App. at 209. The court also enjoined the City from enforcing 
Ordinance 95-56 "to the extent that it contains a complete 
prohibition on live entertainment through the use of 
individual or `conversational booths.' " App. at 210. 
However, the court gave the City defendants leave"to 
petition the court to amend this injunction at such time as 
they can demonstrate a link between a reasonable 
prohibition on the booths and the government's health 
interest in this situation." App. at 210. Regretfully, the 
court's order did not include any written or explicit oral 
findings of fact or conclusions of law, which would have 
been helpful in our review of the rationale for the order 
entered. 
 
On November 3, 1995, Ben Rich moved the court for an 
additional order permitting it to "proceed with the offering 
to the public of live entertainment in a `conversational 
booth' setting and enjoining the Defendants from 
preventing or interfering with same," app. at 212, on the 
ground that the sole basis for the decision of the Zoning 
Board was Ordinance 95-56, which the district court had 
now declared unconstitutional. At the hearing on Ben 
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Rich's motion, the City argued that Ben Rich should be 
required to return to the Zoning Board for a decision 
whether conversation booths were a permitted use as an 
Indoor Theater under its original zoning regulations, 
regardless of the unenforceability of Ordinance 95-56, as 
the Zoning Board had never addressed that issue. 
 
The district court believed that the Zoning Board could 
not constitutionally decline to classify Ben Rich's 
conversation booths as a permissible use as Indoor Theater 
in light of the classification of video presentations in similar 
booths as Indoor Theater. The court stated: 
 
         But if it's an issue that eventually will lend itself to a 
         constitutional interpretation, then I think many times 
         the court should just try to make that interpretation. If 
         it eventually is going to end up [in federal court], 
         there's no sense of having the delay. 
 
         . . . 
 
         I would think that without the ordinance and with the 
         constitutional principles in place, that there is nothing 
         really to impede them to start moving forward. 
 
App. at 278, 280. 
 
The court reminded the City that it was free to amend its 
ordinance in order to put reasonable restrictions on 
conversation booths and conform with the requirements of 
Renton and Mitchell. See, e.g., app. at 279 ("But there is the 
opportunity for the City of Vineland to put sufficient 
contours around the utilization of those booths that would 
meet and justify the least restrictive manner of control that 
would be consistent with the first amendment speech and 
expressive conduct."). 
 
The court entered two supplemental orders on December 
1, 1995. The first refined the earlier order relating to the 
hours ordinance and stated that "Plaintiffs' allowed hours 
of operation shall be no different than those of other 
commercial businesses existing within the B-2 business 
zone." App. at 296. The second order permitted Ben Rich to 
"herewith proceed with the offering of live entertainment in 
a conversational booth setting as originally requested by 
them in a site plan submitted and duly filed with the 
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Planning Board of the City of Vineland," app. at 298, but 
contained the proviso that: 
 
         [T]he rulings contained herein shall in no way affect 
         the Defendants' rights to enact legislation which they 
         deem appropriate in order to protect the public health 
         and welfare from adverse secondary effects of an adult 
         oriented business. Plaintiffs by proceeding under the 
         terms of this Order do so at the peril of being subjected 
         in the future to such appropriate and lawful 
         regulations as the City of Vineland may enact and may 
         apply to the Plaintiffs in accordance with 
         Constitutional and State Law. 
 
App. at 298. The City appeals from the November 2, 1995 
preliminary injunction order and from the December 1 
orders. 
 
II. 
 
It is surprising that although the underlying orders on 
appeal are preliminary injunctions, neither party discusses 
the standard for a preliminary injunction nor is there any 
reference to that standard in the district court's orders or 
discussion. We have found no stipulation in the record by 
the parties that consolidated the preliminary injunction 
hearing with a trial on the merits, as permitted under Rule 
65(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and we are 
not free to disregard the procedural posture in which the 
orders are presented on appeal. Thus, we review the district 
court's grant of a preliminary injunction to ascertain 
whether plaintiff made the necessary showing that it is 
likely to prevail on the merits, will suffer irreparable injury 
if injunctive relief is not granted, and that the injunction is 
generally in the public interest. See Bradley v. Pittsburgh 
Bd. Of Educ., 910 F.2d 1172, 1175 (3d Cir. 1990). 
 
III. 
 
Speech that is sexually explicit but not "obscene," either 
in the form of film, text, or live presentation, must be 
accorded First Amendment protection. See Schad v. 
Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65-66 (1981); 
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Phillips v. Borough of Keyport, 107 F.3d 164, 172 (3d Cir. 
1997) (en banc). Any regulation of such sexually explicit 
speech that is aimed primarily at suppressing the content 
of the speech is subject to strict scrutiny by the court and, 
unless justified by a compelling governmental interest, is 
presumptively unconstitutional. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 46. 
However, if a regulation's primary purpose is to ameliorate 
the socially adverse secondary effects of speech-related 
activity, the regulation is deemed content-neutral, and is 
accordingly measured by intermediate scrutiny, under the 
Court's traditional time, place, manner doctrine. See Turner 
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 642 
(1994); Phillips, 107 F.3d at 171. 
 
Vineland's ordinances at issue are purportedly directed at 
curbing the secondary effects of Ben Rich's speech related 
activity. Time, place, manner regulations of protected 
speech are valid if: 
 
         (1) they are justified without reference to the content of 
         the regulated speech; 
 
         (2) they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant or 
         substantial government interest; and 
 
         (3) they leave open ample alternative channels for 
         communication. 
 
Mitchell, 10 F.3d at 130. 
 
A. 
 
THE CLOSING HOURS ORDINANCE 
 
Ordinance 95-55 provides: 
 
         A sexually oriented business as defined by N.J.S. 
         2C:33-12.1 2(a) and (b) including adult book stores 
         may not be open for business before 8:00 a.m. or after 
         10 p.m., Mondays through Saturdays or on any 
         Sunday or legal holiday. 
 
App. at 65. 
 
"The principal inquiry in determining content neutrality, 
in speech cases generally and in time, place, manner cases 
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 in particular, is whether the government has adopted a 
regulation of speech because of disagreement with the 
message it conveys." Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 
U.S. 781, 791 (1989). Despite Ben Rich's protests, there 
was no evidence at the hearing that the City of Vineland 
specifically targeted Ben Rich's establishment or that "the 
predominate purpose for enacting the ordinances was to 
suppress constitutionally protected forms of expression." 
Brief of Appellee at 13. To the contrary, the City attempts 
to justify the regulation "without reference to the content of 
the regulated speech," Renton, 475 U.S. at 48, and its 
burden for proving such content neutrality is not heavy. 
According to the Court in Renton, if an ordinance does "not 
ban adult theaters altogether" but merely bans them from 
certain parts of the city, it is properly analyzed as a time, 
place, manner restriction. Id. at 41. 
 
Nevertheless, under this framework the City must still 
have presented evidence of "incidental adverse social effect 
that provides the important governmental interest 
justifying" the content neutral regulation and must be able 
to "articulate and support its argument with a reasoned 
and substantial basis demonstrating the link between the 
regulation and the asserted governmental interest." Phillips, 
107 F.3d at 173 (internal quotations omitted). 
 
Ben Rich contends that, far from justifying the content 
neutrality of the ordinance on a reasoned basis, Vineland 
produced no evidence that it considered secondary effects 
of adult establishments at the time it passed the 
ordinances. However, in our recent en banc decision in 
Phillips, which was decided after the district court entered 
the orders on appeal, we rejected the argument that a 
municipality's justification must be apparent "at the time of 
adoption," or "before taking [legislative] action." Phillips, 
107 F.3d at 178. Although we reiterated the requirement 
that a municipality "shoulder the burden of building an 
evidentiary record that would support a finding that . . . 
[governmental] interests would be jeopardized in the 
absence of an ordinance," id. at 173, we also held that such 
a record could be established in the court after legislation 
is passed and challenged, id. at 178. 
 
We stated that: 
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         There is a significant difference between the 
         requirement that there be a factual basis for a 
         legislative judgment presented in court when that 
         judgment is challenged and a requirement that such a 
         factual basis have been submitted to the legislative 
         body prior to the enactment of the legislative measure. 
         We have always required the former; we have never 
         required the latter. 
 
Id. Thus, in Phillips we refused to hold unconstitutional a 
borough's ordinance that zoned out the plaintiff 's adult 
bookstore despite the fact that the borough had not made 
a pre-enactment record before the legislature regarding 
secondary effects and presented no such evidence in the 
district court. Instead, we remanded the case to the district 
court in order to give the borough an opportunity to develop 
such evidence. See Phillips, 107 F.3d at 181. 
 
In this case, because Vineland did come forward as 
required by Phillips "with a required showing in the 
courtroom once the challenge [was] raised," id. at 178, we 
examine whether its showing was adequate. In the district 
court, Vineland relied both on the evidence presented to the 
New Jersey legislature in connection with its consideration 
and subsequent passage of a state statute on July 5, 1995 
dealing with almost identical issues, and on the record 
presented in support of the Delaware statute that we 
upheld in Mitchell. 
 
It placed particular emphasis on the New Jersey record. 
Before enactment of the New Jersey statute, which 
authorized municipalities to restrict the hours of operation 
of adult oriented businesses and made it a crime to "own[ ] 
or operate[ ] a sexually oriented business which offers for 
public use booths, screens, enclosures, or other devices 
which facilitate sexual activity by patrons," see N.J.S.A. 2C: 
33-12.2, the New Jersey legislature had heard testimony 
from various witnesses who described how adult 
establishments contribute to crime and litter in 
surrounding areas and how private booths within these 
stores encourage people to have unprotected sex with 
anonymous partners and thereby facilitate the spread of 
sexually transmitted diseases, particularly AIDS. See app. 
at 79 (Testimony of John Tumulty, Chief of Legislative 
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Section of New Jersey Office of Legislative Services, to 
Senate Judiciary Committee); app. at 80-100 (Testimony 
and Exhibits by Debbie Crook, President of Atlantic County 
Branch of American Family Association of New Jersey, to 
Senate Judiciary Committee); app. at 110 (Testimony of 
Susan Grant, State Director of Concerned Women of 
America, to Assembly Judiciary Committee); app. at 116-19 
(Testimony of Larry Etzweiler, Deputy Attorney General of 
New Jersey, to Assembly Judiciary Committee). 
 Testimony was presented to the relevant New Jersey 
legislative committees that a similar statute enacted by 
Delaware that prohibited operation of adult establishments 
before 10 a.m. and after 10 p.m., Mondays through 
Saturdays, and all day on Sundays and legal holidays, had 
been upheld against constitutional challenge by this court 
in Mitchell. Larry Etzweiler, New Jersey Deputy Attorney 
General, appeared before the Judiciary, Law and Public 
Safety Committee of the New Jersey State Assembly and 
told the members of that Committee that in their 
considerations of the pending bill they 
 
         could deem the hours-of-operation restriction as 
         advancing the goal of affording neighbors peace and 
         quiet at least during part of the day, and of 
         diminishing the "noise, excessive parking, and the 
         presence of discarded sexually oriented material on 
         residential lawns that adult entertainment 
         establishments cause." 
 
App. at 118 (quoting Mitchell, 10 F.3d at 136). 
 
In this case, Etzweiler filed an affidavit in the district 
court describing some of the evidence that had been 
presented to the New Jersey legislative committees, and he 
stated that the "Committee members understood that 
patrons are more likely to discard sexually oriented 
materials on residential lawns during the cover of night 
than during the openness of broad daylight." App. at 118. 
In Mitchell, we had found such a justification to be both 
content neutral and substantial. The studies and legislative 
record in support of the hours regulation for adult theaters 
that was presented in Mitchell and other courts, see, e.g., 
Star Satellite v. City of Biloxi, 779 F.2d 1074, 1077-78 (5th 
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Cir. 1986), may have been more extensive than those 
provided by either Vineland or New Jersey, but we cannot 
hold that it was impermissible for Vineland to rely on the 
experiences, studies and conclusions of other jurisdictions 
about the secondary effects of adult theaters. See Renton, 
475 U.S. at 51-52 ("The First Amendment does not require 
a city, before enacting such an ordinance, to conduct new 
studies or produce evidence independent of that already 
generated by other cities, so long as whatever evidence the 
city relies upon is reasonably believed to be relevant to the 
problem that the city addresses.") 
 
Notwithstanding the district court's acknowledgment that 
Vineland was entitled to rely on studies and experiences 
from other jurisdictions in justifying their time, place, 
manner regulation, the court apparently believed that 
Vineland was required to specify a "linkage" between its 
own experiences and those of the jurisdictions producing 
the studies upon which it intended to rely. App. at 171. The 
court noted that Vineland did not show, for example, that 
the adult bookstores were near residential areas susceptible 
to late-night litter or that there is a parking problem of the 
kind that may have existed in Delaware. However, the 
relevant cases do not impose a requirement that Vineland 
lay out in specific detail how its situation is sufficiently 
similar to Delaware's or New Jersey's in order to make their 
studies relevant. 
 
As Vineland is a municipality within New Jersey, the 
studies presented to the New Jersey legislature could 
"reasonably [be] believed to be relevant to the problem" 
Vineland was facing. See Phillips, 107 F.3d at 174. The 
same can be said of the relevance of the Delaware studies. 
The various jurisdictions are not so geographically distant 
nor demographically distinct as to suggest that they do not 
share comparable urban problems, and Ben Rich has not 
argued otherwise. 
 
The district court was also troubled by the apparent 
underinclusiveness of Vineland's ordinance, noting that 
notwithstanding Vineland's assertion that it needed the 
hours ordinance to limit parking and reduce the 
"discard[ing] [of] sexually oriented material on residential 
lawns," app. at 118, Vineland did not attempt to limit the 
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hours of the nearby WaWa and bar/restaurant or other 
stores selling adult magazines, which presumably also 
produce noise and parking problems, see app. at 120-124. 
 
The district court's concern does not warrant striking 
down the Vineland ordinance. As Vineland points out on 
appeal, on its face Ordinance 95-55 covers any "sexually 
oriented businesses" and thus may be enforceable against 
the other stores in the City that sell adult magazines, an 
issue we do not decide. More important, we have held that 
a state or municipality may regulate hours of adult 
businesses differently than other businesses without 
raising a strong inference of discrimination based on 
content. We stated in Mitchell: "The content of the sexually 
explicit speech and expressive activity that businesses like 
Adult Books purvey permits legislative bodies to put adult 
entertainment establishments in a different category than 
other entertainment establishments." 10 F.3d at 132. We 
also stated that the state "need only show that adult 
entertainment establishments as a class cause the 
unwanted secondary effects the statute regulates." Id. at 
138; see also Renton, 475 U.S. at 49 (" `[G]overnment can 
tailor its reaction to different types of speech according to 
the degree to which its special and overriding interests are 
implicated.' " (quoting Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 
U.S. 50, 82 n.6 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring))). 
 
We thus conclude that Vineland produced the required 
showing of the content neutrality of its closing hours 
ordinance and the substantiality of its interest in 
ameliorating the secondary effects of late-night litter and 
parking related to adult book stores. 
 
To sustain the validity of the ordinance against First 
Amendment challenge, we must also decide if the proffered 
regulation is narrowly tailored. The government bears the 
burden of showing that the remedy it has adopted does not 
"burden substantially more speech than is necessary to 
further the government's legitimate interests." Ward, 491 
U.S. at 799. Vineland points out that its ordinance is no 
more restrictive than the Delaware hours restriction upheld 
by this court in Mitchell and, in fact, allows businesses to 
open two hours earlier. Moreover, under the fairly lenient 
standard for time, place, manner restrictions, "[t]he city 
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must be allowed a reasonable opportunity to experiment 
with solutions to admittedly serious problems." Renton, 475 
U.S. at 52 (internal quotations omitted). 
 
Finally, with respect to the requirement that the 
ordinance leave open adequate alternative channels of 
communication, we need only look to our dismissal in 
Mitchell of the argument that an hours restriction fails this 
test "because it prohibits adult entertainment during the 
time of greatest customer demand" (late at night). As we 
stated in that case, "the [statute] allows those who choose 
to hear, view, or participate publicly in sexually explicit 
expressive activity more than thirty-six hundred hours per 
year to do so. We think the Constitution requires no more." 
See Mitchell, 10 F.3d at 139. 
 
We assume that underlying its preliminary injunction 
was the district court's conclusion that Ben Rich had 
shown a probability of success on the merits. We conclude, 
to the contrary, that based on the evidence, Ordinance 95- 
55 is a permissible time, place, manner restriction. It 
follows that we need not reach the other factors to be 
considered in preliminary injunction review, as this 
preliminary injunction cannot stand. 
 B. 
 
CONVERSATION BOOTHS ORDINANCE 
 
The language of subsection (1) of Vineland Ordinance 95- 
56, which is a land use ordinance, prohibits any uses in 
adult bookstores except the "sale or rental of books, videos, 
and novelties, and on-site rental for viewing of videos and 
movies." App. at 44. On its face, this appears to effect a 
complete prohibition of all live dancing, nude or otherwise, 
in adult bookstores, and as such would be of questionable 
validity under Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 
61 (1981). Although the court's Order to Show Cause 
required the City to show cause why the court "should not 
issue a preliminary injunction enjoining [the] defendants 
from enforcing City of Vineland ordinances 95-55 and 95- 
56," app. at 53, and presumably therefore the entire 
ordinance was at issue, the preliminary injunction itself 
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only enjoins the City from enforcing 95-56 "to the extent 
that it contains a complete prohibition on live 
entertainment through the use of individual or 
`conversational booths,' " app. at 210 (emphasis added). This 
is the subject of subsection (2), which was particularly 
referenced in the Order to Show Cause. Therefore, on this 
appeal from that preliminary injunction, we need not 
consider the reach of subsection (1) because its validity was 
not decided by the district court. We limit our consideration 
to the issue that most interests the parties - the injunction 
as to the conversation booths regulation. 
 
Vineland argues that the district court entered its 
November 2, 1995 order preliminarily enjoining 
enforcement of Ordinance 95-56, "to the extent that it 
contains a complete prohibition on live entertainment 
through the use of individual or conversation booths," app. 
at 210, under the incorrect belief that subsection (2) of the 
Ordinance effected a complete prohibition on the offering of 
live entertainment in conversation booths. 
 
Vineland has presented a persuasive case that there is a 
substantial governmental interest in preventing anonymous 
sex in conversation booths and in controlling the spread of 
sexually transmitted diseases. Vineland presented evidence 
to the district court, taken from the legislative history of the 
New Jersey statute, that in booths in adult bookstores, 
patrons have unprotected sex with anonymous partners 
either in the same booth or through an opening to an 
adjacent booth, or masturbate, and that such conduct 
promotes the spread of AIDS. See, e.g. , app. at 80-100 
(Testimony of Debbie Crook). Vineland also presented 
legislative history from the Delaware statute regarding 
similar secondary effects of adult booths, which the court 
in Mitchell found sufficient to withstand First Amendment 
objections. See app. at 101-08. 
 
The substantial interest in controlling anonymous sex in 
adult entertainment establishments is adequately 
documented by Vineland. See Chez Sez VIII v. Poritz, No. 
95-3349 (N.J. Super. Ct., Law Div. Aug. 31, 1995) 
("[h]alting the spread of [AIDS] and other communicable 
diseases by reducing the incidence of promiscuous, 
unprotected sex undoubtedly constitutes a compelling state 
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interest"), rev'd on other grounds, 688 A.2d 119 (N.J. App. 
Div. 1997). 
 
This does not mean that a complete ban on live 
entertainment in conversation booths in adult bookstores 
would meet the requirement of being narrowly tailored to 
achieve this end. In Mitchell, we distinguished the Delaware 
statute that required that booths in adult bookstores be 
open on at least one side, which we upheld, from one that 
imposed a total ban on such booths, noting: "Delaware's 
open-booth amendment does not ban films or other 
entertainment. . . . It is not directed at limiting the content 
of films or performances patrons can view from within the 
booths, but rather at curbing the undesirable incidental 
effects that are perceived to result from the use of closed 
booths in adult entertainment establishments." 10 F.3d at 
140. Indeed, virtually all ordinances that courts have 
upheld which have sought to reduce the effects of 
anonymous sex in adult entertainment establishments have 
imposed an "open booth" requirement. See Mitchell, 10 F.3d 
at 128 (open on one side to a public room); Bamon Corp. v. 
City of Dayton, 923 F.2d 470 (6th Cir. 1991) (removal of 
doors); Doe v. City of Minneapolis, 898 F.2d 612, 620 (8th 
Cir. 1990) (open on one side); Berg v. Health and Hospital 
Corp., 865 F.2d 797, 803 (7th Cir. 1989) (open on one side 
to a public room; "does not bar people from watching films 
or entertainment in individual enclosures"); Wall 
Distributors, Inc. v. City of Newport News, 782 F.2d 1165, 
1167 (4th Cir. 1986) (visible from continuous aisle). 
 
Subsection (2) of Ordinance 95-56 only prohibits the use 
of conversation booths if they allow for privacy between 
dancer and patron or if the booths would "facilitate sexual 
activity." We construe that conditional restriction as 
tantamount to an "open booth" requirement since an owner 
can satisfy the non-private condition by leaving at least one 
side of the booth open to the public area. See Mitchell, 10 
F.3d at 139-40 (Delaware statute requires such booths to 
have "at least one side open to an adjacent public room so 
that the area inside is visible to persons in adjacent public 
rooms"). 
 
This is the construction given by the New Jersey 
Appellate Division in upholding the New Jersey statute that 
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prohibits conversation booths that "facilitate sexual 
activity," notwithstanding its failure to explicitly require 
open booths. See Chez Vez VIII, Inc. v. Poritz, 688 A.2d 119, 
122 (N.J. Super. 1997). The court concluded that if a booth 
is visible to a public room it would not be conducive to 
sexual activity, and thus the "statute embraces all the 
physical requirements of other jurisdictions [that impose 
open booth requirements]." Id. at 128. Inasmuch as 
Vineland's Ordinance 95-56 contains language similar to 
that in the New Jersey statute, it is reasonable for us to 
construe it in the same way as imposing an open booth 
requirement. 
 
Following the district court's December 1, 1995 order 
inviting the City to enact additional regulations to control 
secondary effects within constitutional constraints, on April 
23, 1996, Vineland passed Ordinance 96-32 entitled,"An 
Ordinance of the City of Vineland Relating to Sexually 
Contagious Diseases." See Ben Rich Trading, Inc. v. City of 
Vineland, No. 96-cv-2496, slip op. at 3 (D.N.J. Jan. 10, 
1997). The Ordinance imposes a more explicit open booth 
requirement by mandating that booths in adult theaters 
have " `at least one side open to an adjacent public room so 
that the area inside is visible to persons in the adjacent 
public room.' "1 Id. at 3-4 (quoting City of Vineland 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. It provides in pertinent part: 
 
         No person shall own, operate, manage, rent, lease or exercise 
control 
         of any commercial building, structure, premises or portion or 
part 
         thereof, which contains: 
 
          (1) Partition between subdivisions of a room, portion or part of 
a 
         building, structure or premises having an aperture which is 
         designed or constructed to facilitate sexual activity between 
persons 
         on either side of the petition (sic). 
 
          (2) Booths, stalls, or partitioned portions of a room, or 
individual 
         rooms, used for the viewing of motion pictures or other forms of 
         entertainment, having doors, curtains or portal partitions, 
unless 
         such booths, stalls, partitioned portions of a room, or 
individual 
         rooms so used shall have at least one side open to an adjacent 
         public room so that the area inside is visible to persons in the 
         adjacent public room. 
 
Ben Rich, No. 96-cv-2496, at 3-4 (quoting City of Vineland Ordinance 96- 
32). 
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Ordinance 96-32). The district court considering that 
Ordinance upheld it against a constitutional challenge by 
Ben Rich, after concluding that the City adequately 
documented, prior to its enactment, the desired goal of 
preventing anonymous sex in adult theaters and the 
corresponding spread of sexually transmitted diseases. See 
id. at 13. 
 
Ben Rich did not appeal that judgment and, indeed, 
argues that the new ordinance is substantially more 
reasonable and narrowly tailored than Ordinance 95-56. 
However, Ordinance 96-32 is not materially different in 
substance than subsection (2) of Ordinance 95-56 as we 
have construed it and the parties, therefore, do not appear 
to differ on their understanding of the permissible scope of 
Vineland's regulatory authority. In any event, we conclude 
that the district court erred in holding subsection (2) of 
Ordinance 95-56 to infringe on Ben Rich's First 
Amendment rights and in granting a preliminary injunction 
enjoining its operation.2 
 
IV. 
 
For the reasons stated above, we will reverse the 
preliminary injunction order entered November 5, 1995 and 
the orders of December 1, 1995. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
         Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
         for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. In light of our holding, we need not reach Vineland's argument that 
the district court should not have issued the December 1, 1995 order 
permitting Ben Rich to proceed with the offering of conversation booths 
without requiring Ben Rich to return to the Zoning Board for a decision 
as to whether conversation booths are a permitted use as an Indoor 
Theatre. Should the issue arise when this case returns to the district 
court, we note that the district court should give proper consideration to 
Vineland's interest in having its administrative procedures exhausted 
through appeal to the Zoning Board or a request for a variance. 
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